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Opinion Per Curiam.
Dissenting Opinion filed by Circuit Judge MacKinnon.
Per Curiam: This is an appeal from the District Court's dismissal of a
challenge to appellee's use of the treaty power to convey to the Republic of
Panama U.S properties, including the Panama Canal, located in the Panama
Canal Zone.' Appellants, sixty members of the House of Representatives,
sought a declaratory judgment that the exclusive means provided in the Con-
stitution for disposal of United States property requires approval of both
Houses of Congress, see Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, and that therefore the Panama
*77-1471-Mickey Edwards v. James Earl Carter cert. denied 5/15/78.
'Two treaties, signed by the chief executives of Panama and the United States, were presented to
the Senate for ratification. The Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the
Panama Canal has now been ratified by the Senate, see note 2 infra. The Article conveying the
Canal Zone properties to the Republic of Panama is contained in the Panama Canal Treaty.
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Canal Zone may not be returned to Panama through the Treaty process, which
invests the treaty-making power in the President by and with the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate, see Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Appellee contends
that the Constitution permits U.S. territory to be disposed of either through
congressional legislation or through the treaty process, and that therefore the
President's decision to proceed under the treaty power is constitutionally per-
missible.
The District Court did not reach the merits of this controversy; rather, it
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction after concluding that ap-
pellants lacked standing because they had failed to demonstrate injury in fact
from the President's invocation of the treaty process. A notice of appeal and a
request for a preliminary injunction pending appeal were immediately filed
with this court. Appellee has moved for summary affirmance of the District
Court's judgment either on the jurisdictional grounds stated by the District
Court or on the merits of appellants' contention; appellants have moved for
summary reversal. We have heard oral argument and have considered the case
on an expedited basis.2 For the reasons appearing below, we affirm the
dismissal of the complaint, not on the jurisdictional ground relied on by the
District Court but for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
I.
In addition to its argument on the merits, appellee has presented several
substantial and complex challenges to the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
adjudicate the merits of the constitutional question presented in this case. We
refer not only to the contentions as to lack of standing, but also to the
arguments that appellants' action is both premature and presents a non-
justiciable political question. Deciding only the jurisdictional issue before us
could result in this court, or the Supreme Court, remanding the case for fur-
ther proceedings either on the merits or on jurisdictional issues. Because the
merits of this controversy present a pure question of law, with no need of a
hearing for fact development, because these merits are so clearly against the
parties asserting jurisdiction, and because the judgment appealed from was
based on only one of several asserted grounds of lack of jurisdiction, we
believe it is appropriate to proceed directly to the merits of this case. This con-
clusion is bolstered when the time constraints imposed by the immediacy of
Senate action on the treaties are considered. See Adams v. Vance, No.
77-1960 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 1978), at 8, note 7 and cases cited therein.
'The Senate consented to the Neutrality Treaty on March 14, 1978. It is expected that the vote
on the Panama Canal Treaty will occur in early April 1978.
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Consequently, the precise question we address is whether the constitutional
delegation found in Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 is exclusive so as to prohibit the disposi-
tion of U.S. property by self-executing treaty-i.e., a treaty enacted in accor-
dance with Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, which becomes effective without implementing
legislation.
II.
Article IV, § 3, cl. 2 of the Constitution states in its entirety:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regula-
tions respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and
nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the
United States, or of any particular State.
Appellants contend that this clause gives Congress exclusive power to con-
vey to foreign nations any property, such as the Panama Canal, owned by the
United States.' We find such a construction to be at odds with the wording of
this and similar grants of power to the Congress, and, most significantly, with
the history of the constitutional debates.'
The grant of authority to Congress under the property clause states that
"The Congress shall have Power . . .," not that only the Congress shall have
power, or that the Congress shall have exclusive power. In this respect the pro-
perty clause is parallel to Article I, § 8, which also states that "The Congress
shall have Power. . . ... Many of the powers thereafter enumerated in § 8 in-
volve matters that were at the time the Constitution was adopted and are
at the present time also commonly the subject of treaties. The most prominent
example of this is the regulation of commerce with foreign nations, Art. I, § 8,
cl. 3, and appellants do not go so far as to contend that the treaty process is not
a constitutionally allowable means for regulating foreign commerce. It thus
seems to us that, on its face, the property clause is intended not to restrict the
scope of the treaty clause, but, rather, is intended to permit Congress to ac-
'In addressing the merits, we assume without deciding that the Panama Canal Zone real proper-
ty which would be conveyed by the Panamal Canal Treaty is indeed property belonging to the
United States. Appellee has not contended otherwise and neither party has briefed this issue.
'The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has thoroughly considered and rejected appellants'
argument. That Committee reported the treaties with Panama to the full Senate by a 14 to I vote,
and the one dissenting Senator did not dispute the power of the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to transfer United States property. See EXEC. REPT. No. 95-12 (95th
Cong. 2d Sess., Feb. 3, 1978).
In addition to the American Law Institute's Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, see infra,
other authorities in agreement with this conclusion include Professor Louis Henkin, see
L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 159-60 (1965); Dean Louis Pollalk, see 124
CONG. REC., No. 8, at 5729 (95th Cong., Jan. 30, 1978); Professor Covey Oliver, see Hearings
Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Part IV, at 95, 103, 112-13 (Jan. 19, 1978); and Pro-
fessor John Norton Moore, see id. at 89, 93-94.
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complish through legislation what may concurrently be accomplished through
other means provided in the Constitution.
The American Law Institute's (ALI) Restatement of Foreign Relations,
directly addressing this issue, comes to the same conclusion we reach:
The mere fact, however, that a congressional power exists does not mean that the
power is exclusive so as to preclude the making of a self-executing treaty within the
area of that power.
ALI RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (2d), § 141, at 435 (1965). The
section of the Restatement relied on by the dissent merely states that the treaty
power, like all powers granted to the United States, is limited by other
restraints found in the Constitution on the exercise of governmental power
(Rest. For. Rel. § 117).' Of course the correctness of this proposition as a mat-
ter of constitutional law is clear. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Geof-
froy v. Riggs, 132 U.S. 258 (1890); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 33Z (1924),
also relied on by the dissent. To urge, as does the dissent, that the transfer of
the Canal Zone property by treaty offends this well-settled principle-that the
treaty power can only be exercised in a manner which conforms to the Con-
stitution-begs the very question to be decided, namely, whether Art. IV, § 3,
cl. 2 places in the Congress the exclusive authority to dispose of U.S. property.'
There are certain grants of authority to Congress which are, by their very
terms, exclusive. In these areas, the treaty-making power and the power of
Congress are not concurrent; rather, the only department of the federal
government authorized to take action is the Congress ... prohibit the use of
the treaty power to impose taxes. .... I
Thus it appears from the very language used in the property clause that this
provision was not intended to preclude the availability of self-executing
treaties as a means for disposing of U.S. property. The history of the drafting
and ratification of that clause confirms this conclusion. The other clause in
'Similarly, § 118(1) of the Restatement lends no support to the dissent's position because it is not
even relevant to the issue before us. That section, consistent with Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1920), indicates that the treaty power is broader than the power of Congress to enact legisla-
tion. The issue before us, on the other hand, is whether the treaty power extends to an area in
which Congress, by virtue of Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, does have power to enact legislation.
'It is important to understand the limited scope of this inquiry. If Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 does in fact
provide the exclusive means of property disposition, i.e., by legislation, clearly a self-executing
treaty would be a constitutionally impermissible alternative. As the dissent repeatedly indicates,
the treaty power may not encroach on delegations made exclusively to Congress.
'The dissent argues that because the power to declare war is exclusively reserved to Congress by
Art. 1, § 8, so also must be the power to dispose of United States property, which power is granted
to Congress in the same language as the war-making power. Cf. L. HENKIN. supra, at 160 n. 4
The sui generis nature of a declaration of war and the unique history indicating the Framers' desire
to have both Houses of Congress concur in such a declaration, may place it apart from the other
congressional powers enumerated in Art. 1, § 8 and in Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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Art. IV, § 3 concerns the procedures for admission of new states into the
Union, and the debates at the Constitutional Convention clearly demonstrate
that the property clause was intended to delineate the role to be played by the
central government in the disposition of Western lands (U.S.) which were
potential new states. Several individual states had made territorial claims to
portions of these lands; and as finally enacted, the property clause, introduced
in the midst of the Convention's consideration of the admission of new states,
sought to preserve both federal claims and conflicting state claims to certain
portions of the Western lands.8
The proceedings of the Virginia state ratifying convention provided further
evidence of the limited scope of the property clause. During the debate in
which the meaning of the clause was questioned, Mr. Grayson noted that the
sole purpose for including this provision was to preserve the property rights of
the states and the federal government to the western territory as these rights
existed during the Confederation.'
This history demonstrates the limited concerns giving rise to the inclusion of
Article IV, § 3, cl. 2 in the Constitution. Whether or not this historical perspec-
tive might serve as a basis for restricting the scope of congressional power
under the property clause, we view it as persuasive evidence for rejecting the
claim that Article IV is an express limitation on the treaty power, foreclosing
the availability of that process as a constitutionally permissible means of
disposing of American interests in the Panama Canal Zone.
IlI.
The debates over the treaty clause at the Constitutional Convention and
state ratifying conventions even more directly demonstrate the Framers' intent
to permit the disposition of U.S. property by treaty without House approval.
As originally reported to the Convention, authority to make treaties would
have been entrusted to a majority of the Senate, without even Presidential par-
ticipation.I0 However, this structure was thought to entrust too much power to
the Senate, and the provision was subsequently amended to include an active
Presidential role. Nonetheless, concern over the extensive scope of the power
remained; particularly worrisome was the potential use of treaties as a means
of effecting territorial cessions. Elbridge Gerry expressed this fear when he
'See H. HOCKETr, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1776-1826, 143-46(1939); 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 461-66 (1937); 3 id. at
226-27.
'This issue arose in a debate over the treaty clause that was not unlike the controversy before this
court. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES CONVENTIONS ON THE ADAPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION 504-05 (1907).
"The account in the text is from 2 FARRAND, supra, at 540-49.
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noted that "[iln Treaties of peace the dearest interests will be at stake, as the
fisheries, territory, etc. In treaties of peace also there is more danger to the ex-
tremities of the Continent, of being sacrificed than on any other occasion."',
Concern about the sweeping character of the treaty clause led to several pro-
posed amendments aimed at limiting its exercise.
The Committee of Eleven, in whose hands this issue finally rested, rejected
the proposed amendment for House participation. Instead, a provision requir-
ing a two-thirds Senate vote for the passage of all treaties was adopted. This
choice clearly indicates the Framers' satisfaction with a supermajoritarian re-
quirement in the Senate, rather than House approval, to serve as a check upon
the improvident cessation of U.S. territory.
That the two-thirds voting requirement did not affect the scope of the treaty
power, but only made ratification of treaties more difficult, was clearly
understood at the state ratifying conventions. An amendment proposed at the
Virginia Convention provided that
no treaty ceding, contracting, restraining, or suspending the territorial rights or
claims of the United States ... shall be made, but in case of the most urgent and ex-
treme necessity; nor shall any such treaty be ratified without the concurrence of three
fourths of the whole number of the members of both houses respectively. 2
This, and a similar amendment offered at the North Carolina Convention,'3
evidence the broad interpretation given Article II, § 2, at the time of its incep-
tion." As was true of the effort at the Constitutional Convention to introduce
House participation in ratification of treaties, these state attempts to limit the
treaty power as now contained in the Constitution also failed.
That those who framed and ratified the Constitution rejected several express
attempts to limit the treaty power in the manner now urged by appellants
greatly undermines the interpretation of that power they press upon us. From
this evidence we conclude that the disposition of property pursuant to the trea-
ty power and without the express approval of the House of Representatives
was both contemplated and authorized by the makers of the Constitution.
IV.
In view of the lack of ambiguity as to the intended effects of the treaty and
property clauses, it may be surprising that judicial pronouncements over the
S'Id. at 541.
"Id. at 660.
"See S. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 63 (2d Ed. 1916); 4 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra, at 115.
"James Madison stated that "I do not conceive that power is given to the President and Senate
to dismember the empire, or to alienate any great, essential right." But he continued by noting "I
do not think the whole legislative authority have this power. The exercise of the power must be
consistent with the object of the delegation." 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra, at 514.
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past two centuries relating to these constitutional provisions are somewhat
vague and conflicting. However, none of the actual holdings in these cases ad-
dressed the precise issue before us-whether the property clause prohibits the
transfer of U.S. property to foreign nations through self-executing treaties.
While, therefore, neither the holdings nor the dicta of these previous cases are
dispositive of the case before us, we believe that in the main they support the
conclusions we have stated heretofore.
One line of cases, involving the property clause, has arisen iii the context of
the division of power between the tederal government and the states.
Another line or cases, involving tne treaty clause, has arisen in the context of
conveyances by the federal government to Indian tribes. The leading case on
the power to convey such land by self-executing treaty is Holden v. Joy, 84
U.S. 211 (1872). In quieting adverse claims to certain lands west of the
Mississippi which had previously been conveyed to the Cherokee nation by
treaty, the Court had to determine the validity of the original grant to the In-
dians. The Court noted that
Still it is insisted that the President and Senate, in concluding [a treaty for the passage
of property], could not lawfully convenant that a patent should issue to convey lands
which belonged to the United States without the consent of Congress .... On the
contrary, there are many authorities where it is held that a treaty may convey to a
grantee good title to such lands without an act of Congress conferring it .... Id. at
247.
Because later congressional enactments repeatedly recognized the validity of
the transfer, the Court found it unnecessary to rest its decision on this con-
stitutional point. However, the principle espoused is repeated in subsequent
Supreme Court decisions.
Supreme Court cases involving these cessions have provided dicta similar to
that of Holden v. Joy. In Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899), the Court con-
sidered the nature of Indian property rights acquired by "reservation." There,
Chief Moose Dung of the Chippewas had "reserved" a certain tract of land in a
treaty ceding tribal territory to the United States. He subsequently leased some
of that property to various individuals. A challenge was made questioning the
Chief's authority to engage in that transaction. As framed by the Court, the
issue for resolution was whether the treaty merely confirmed Chief Moose
Dung's original right of occupancy in the reserved lands or whether the treaty
granted a fee simple interest to the reservee.' I In holding that a fee simple passed
under the treaty the court noted that "[i]t is well settled that good title to
"Jones v. Meehan discussed and rejected as irreconcilable with later Supreme Court opinions
the contrary views expressed by Attorney General Taney and Justice Nelson, which are also relied
on by the dissent in the case before us. 175 U.S. at 12-14.
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parts of the lands of an Indian tribe may be granted to individuals by treaty
between the United States and the tribe, without any act of Congress, or any
patent from the Executive authority of the United States." 175 U.S. at 10.
Thus the Court concluded that the treaty power alone was sufficient to
transfer the underlying U.S. title in the reserved lands. In a similar situation
the Court in Francis v. Francis, 203 U.S. 233, 241-42 (1906), stated that "this
court and the highest court of Michigan concur in holding that a title in fee
may pass by treaty without the aid of an act of Congress."
As is true of most of the cases in which the Supreme Court has addressed the
scope of the treaty power, Holden, Jones, and Francis involved the federal
government's interaction with Indian tribes. Because of the sui generis nature
of the relationship between the Indian tribes and the federal government, it
might be argued that these decisions are not dispositive.' 6 We think, however,
that they are persuasively supportive of the authority of the President and the
Senate under the treaty clause.
V.
While certain earlier judicial interpretations of the interplay between the
property clause and the treaty clause may be somewhat confused and less than
dispositive of the precise issue before us, past treaty practice is thoroughly con-
sistent with the revealed intention of the Framers of these clauses. In addition
to the treaties with Indian tribes upheld in the cases discussed above, there are
many other instances of self-executing treaties with foreign nations, including
Panama, which cede land or other property assertedly owned by the United
States. 7 That some transfers have been effected through a congressional
enactment instead of, or in addition to, a treaty signed by the President and
ratified by two-thirds of the Senate lends no support to appellants' position in
this case, because, as stated previously, self-executing treaties and congres-
sional enactments are alternative, concurrent means provided in the Constitu-
tion for disposal of United States property.
For instance, the Treaty with Panama of 1955, 6 U.S.T. 2273, transferred
certain property (a strip of water and other sites within the Canal Zone) to
"Although this unique relationship has often been cited as a basis for distinguishing "Indian
cases," we question the applicability of the distinction to this case. This sui generis relationship is
traditionally found in the context of individual rights, and it does not seem directly relevant to the
scope of the treaty power vis-a-vis other sources of federal power. The Supreme Court long ago
noted that "the power to make treaties with the Indian tribes is as we have seen, coextensive with
that to make treaties with foreign nations." United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188,
197 (1876).
"See, e.g., Florida Treaty with Spain of 1819, 8 Stat. 252 (256); Treaty Between the United
States and Great Britain (Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 1842); 12 Bevans 82, Treaty between the
United States and Japan (June 17, 1971), 23 U.S.T. 447, citations in note 22 infra.
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Panama without concurring legislation by the Congress, while transfer of
other property (owned by the United States but within the jurisdiction of
Panama) was, under the terms of the treaty itself, dependent upon concurring
legislation by the Congress. The decision to cast some but not all of the articles
of conveyance in non-self-executing form was a policy choice; it was not re-
quired by the Constitution.
The transfer of property contemplated in the current instance is part of a
broader effort in the conduct of our foreign affairs to strengthen relations with
another country, and indeed with the whole of Latin America. The Framers in
their wisdom have made the treaty power available to the President, the chief
executant of foreign relations under our constitutional scheme, by and with
the advice and consent of two-thirds of the members of the Senate present, as a
means of accomplishing these public purposes. We do not think it is relevant
that many previous treaties couched in self-executing terms have been different
in scope, dealing with boundary issues or otherwise ceding land which was
claimed both by the United States and by a foreign nation.'I We note first that
it is hardly surprising that land transfers often involve boundaries or other
disputed territory; indeed, it is in these situations that the decision to dispose
of land would most often be made.
Second, the grant of power to Congress in the property clause is not
predicated on the territory disposed of being on a boundary or being the sub-
ject of conflicting claims. Thus, we do not understand the basis for appellant's
argument that, even if that clause does not provide the exclusive means of
disposing of disputed or boundary lands, it is the exclusive source of power for
disposing of land concededly owned by the United States. If the status of the
land has any bearing on whether it may be conveyed without congressional
enactment under the property clause,' 9 it would seem to cut in a direction con-
trary to that urged by appellants, for the Western lands that were the focus of
the property clause were the subject of conflicting claims by the states and the
federal government.
It is important to the correct resolution of the legal issue now before us not
to confuse what the Constitution permits with what it prohibits. In deciding
"See, e.g., The Treaty with Mexico of 1933 (Rectification of the Rio Grande), 9 Bevans 976;
The Treaty with Mexico of 1963 (Solution of the Chamizal Problem), 15 U.S.T. 21; The Treaty
with Mexico of 1970 (changing position of Rio Grande to maintain boundary), 23 U.S.T. 371;
Florida Treaty with Spain, supra note 21.
19It is exceedingly difficult to understand why the constitutionality of utilization of the treaty
process should depend on whether the nation to whom the land is conveyed has previously
"claimed" such land.
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that Article IV, Section 3, clause 2 is not the exclusive method contemplated by
the Constitution for disposing of federal property, we hold that the United
States is not prohibited from employing an alternative means constitutionally
authorized.20 Our judicial function in deciding this lawsuit is confined to
assessing the merits of the claim of appellants that in the conduct of foreign
relations in this matter, involving, inter alia, the transfer of property of the
United States, the treaty power as contained in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2,
was not legally available to the President. We hold, contrarily, that this choice
of procedure was clearly consonant with the Constitution.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court dismissing the
complaint is
Affirmed.
MACKINNON. Circuit Judge, dissenting: The United States Constitution in
Article IV, § 3, cl. 2 provides that "The Congress shall have power to dispose
of. . . property belonging to the United States. . ." (emphasis added).
Because of this specific constitutional provision, it is my opinion that the trea-
ty clause does not authorize the President to dispose of the large property in-
terests of the United States in the Panama Canal Agreement without the ap-
proval of Congress to the transfer of the property involved. Yet the pending
treaty with the Republic of Panama would violate the Constitution and disen-
franchise the 435 members of the House of Representatives from voting as
members of "the Congress" upon the proposal to "dispose of" 8 billion
dollars worth of Canal "property belonging to the United States." Since we
are supposedly a participatory democracy, where the right and duty of the en-
tire Congress to participate in that decision is clearly stated in the Constitu-
tion, and has been recognized by prior Presidents, it is almost impossible to
understand the motivation for excluding the House of Representatives from
exercising its constitutional authority.
In my opinion, Senator Connally of Texas, when he was Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, correctly interpreted the Constitution
when he stated in the Senate debate on the procedure to be followed in
authorizing a transfer of United States property to Panama:
The House of Representatives has a right to a voice as to whether any transfer of real
estate or other property shall be made either under treaty or otherwise. 88 CONG. REC.
9267 (December 3, 1942) (emphasis added).
"The dissent tends to obscure the distinction between the treaty power and presidential power
asserted to be inherent in his authority to conduct our foreign relations. There is no doubt that the
latter is more restricted than the former. L. HENKIN, supra at 94-96 (1972).
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Recognizing that the House of Representatives has a vote on the disposition
of the Panama Canal does not operate as a restriction on the "treaty" power.
The Per Curiam opinion is in error in treating this as a matter of "power"
when it is merely a question of ratification procedure. Treaties may still be
entered into by the President upon all subjects that are amenable to interna-
tional agreement, and to become effective the "treaty provisions" must be
ratified by two-thirds of the Senate; but if any treaty attempts to "dispose
of . . .territory or property belonging to the United States . . ." and it is
ratified by the Senate, Art. IV of the Constitution still requires the concur-
rence of the House of Representatives to "carry out the obligation by the
enactment of legislation." Id., Senator Connally, 88 CONG. REC. 9270
(December 3, 1942) (emphasis added). In the transfer to'Panama that was the
subject of Senator Connally's remarks, the Senate by its vote acquiesced in
that procedure and the House joined the Senate in voting to authorize the
transfer of the property to Panama before the agreement was executed.
The net result is that unless it is previously approved by the "Congress,"
i.e., the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Constitution prohibits
the effectuation of a self-executing agreement transferring the property in the
Canal Zone belonging to the United States. The Per Curiam opinion reaches a
different conclusion, but to my mind does not satisfactorily explain why this
enormous disposition of property to the Republic of Panama should not
recognize the proper role of Congress in such transfer as was followed in all
prior transfers where the value of the property was infinitesimal compared to
what is involved here. From its conclusion I thus respectfully dissent...
The Exclusive Power to Dispose of Property
Belonging to the United States
No contention is advanced by this opinion that "Article II treaty power
stops where the power of Congress begins," (Appellee Br., p. 12) but it is con-
tended that in any international agreement the ratification or authorization
procedure must conform to specific constitutional provisions. Therefore, the
specific provisions of the Constitution outside of Art. I, § 8, which designate
"Congress" as the body to levy taxes (Art. I, § 7), appropriate money (Art. I,
§ 9), and dispose of Government property (Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2) require that in-
ternational agreements that transgress into these areas can only become effec-
tive by enactments of Congress. The President cannot violate any of these pro-
visions under the claimed need or desire for a self-executing treaty.
The issue we are confronted with at the outset concerns the proposal in the
Panama Canal treaty (see Appendix) which would immediately replace the in-
terest in perpetuity of the United States in the Panama Canal to act "as though
it were sovereign" with a mere 21-year operational right, would immediately
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transfer the entire Panama Railroad and certain other valuable structures (Ap-
pendix, Art. XIII), and would eventually provide for the automatic transfer on
December 31, 1999, of whatever interest the United States still retained in the
entire Panama Canal. Apellee claims all this can be accomplished by the pen-
ding Carter-Torrijos treaty with nothing more than Senate approval; and that
the participation of the House in those parts of the agreement that dispose of
property belonging to the United States is not required and will not be sought.
Such construction conflicts directly with the above-quoted provision of the
Constitution and with past practices. A number of Supreme Court decisions
also contain statements which recognize the exclusive power of Congress under
Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 to dispose of United States territory and property.*
*Editor's Note: The remainder of Judge MacKinnon's lengthy opinion contains an extended
discussion of precedents in this area.
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